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The philosophical question concerning the very possibility of normativity captures an essential 
puzzlement about what it is or means to be human – inherited into our contemporary discussions 
all the way from Plato’s or Socrates’s criticism of Thrasymachus in Book I of The Republic – 
and in my view it does so more deeply than, for example, the question concerning the nature of 
consciousness. The problem is as old as the Greeks’ distinction between fysis and nomos; 
however, it is not solved by claiming that normativity is based on, or arises from, human 
convention, social negotiation, or something similar. That is merely to restate the issue, because 
such conventional practices already presuppose a normative context. We are thus dealing with 
a problem of infinite regress or circularity, while on the other hand we may also ask whether 
the relevant kind of circularity is vicious or perhaps rather beneficial. In fact, recognizing its 
inevitability is part of my pragmatist reaction to our issue. In a sense, the question about the 
possibility of normativity may have no “solution” at all; what needs to be done is learning to 
live with it. 
Focusing on the idea that a normative context seems to be already presupposed in 
attempts to account for its possibility, this paper starts from the conviction that we need to 
develop a transcendental inquiry into normativity. Such inquiries include, in my somewhat 
relaxed sense, not only Immanuel Kant’s theory of the categories of the understanding as well 
as the moral law,1 but also classical pragmatists’ like Charles S. Peirce’s and William James’s 
views on habits of action, human practices, and constructive purposive activities, as well as the 
later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language-games, forms of life, and rule-following.2 These 
transcendental conceptions of normativity are to be distinguished from metaphysical theories 
                                                        
1 Indeed, normativity is at the core of Kant’s projects both in theoretical and in practical philosophy. 
2 I am not including Hegel in this camp, as I believe the transcendental philosopher of normativity should follow 
Kant rather than Hegel, but I will comment on the concept of recognition, a concept with a strongly Hegelian 
history, in what follows. While I won’t be able to discuss their work in this paper, my approach comes closer to 
the broadly Kantian analysis of the “sources of normativity” by Korsgaard (1996) than, say, Taylor’s (1992) more 
Hegelian position. (For my brief reading of Korsgaard’s project and her notion of practical identity, see Pihlström 
2005, chapter 3.) On the other hand, Taylor’s (1989) notion of “strong evaluation” is readily comparable to the 
idea of the transcendental constitution of irreducible normativity. 
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of the grounds of normativity based on, for example, emergence as well as naturalizing 
reductions, which seem to try to account for normativity from an “external” rather than 
reflexively “internal” perspective (but cf. Pihlström 2010). In brief, a transcendental philosophy 
of normativity seeks to understand and further articulate our commitment to normativity from 
within a framework (practice, form of life) already defined by such a commitment. It may thus 
seek to offer a transcendental “deduction” in the Kantian sense of rendering our commitment 
to norms legitimate3 – rather than a metaphysical, scientific, or empirical explanation of how 
or why the norms we do commit to have arisen. 
For the same reason, transcendental investigations of normativity also need to be 
distinguished from the mainstream approaches of social ontology. A key concept often 
employed in social ontology that we will, however, examine in some more detail in this context 
is recognition. I think of contemporary recognition theory as lying somewhere between 
transcendental and non-transcendental approaches to normativity. While recognition is still 
contingent in a way a fully transcendental ground of normativity cannot be (or so I will argue), 
it can be claimed to be constitutive of social facts and institutions, or even human personhood. 
From the perspective of the present inquiry, an essential question is whether the relevant kind 
of constitutivity is metaphysical in a non-transcendental sense or transcendental in a (quasi-
)Kantian sense. I am not going to examine Kant’s own views here, but we should recall the 
idea, strongly albeit somewhat implicitly present in the First Critique, that the categories of the 
understanding are constitutive of all humanly possible experience and its objects by providing 
normative requirements for what it is to be an object for us. I will try to explain why I am not 
convinced that the kind of normativity that recognition brings to our social world operates at 
the same transcendentally constitutive level.4 
I have elsewhere recommended a negative method for various philosophical purposes of 
pragmatically elucidating what certain concepts mean for us in our lives (cf., e.g., Pihlström 
2014); in the present case, such a method would urge us to take a serious look at various (actual 
                                                        
3 The analogy, of course, is to the de jure question Kant poses in his transcendental deduction of the categories of 
the understanding. 
4 As a first approximation of our main issues, it might be noted that the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights mentions, in §6, the right to recognition before the law – something comparable to what Hannah Arendt 
called “the right to have rights” (cf. Bernstein 2018). Such rights, I will argue, cannot be the source of normativity, 
as they are only possible in a context that is already normatively structured. These fundamental philosophical 
issues become strikingly practical as soon as one notes that, for example, the situation of former Isis women and 
children at refugee camps or of the Guantanamo prisoners can be seen as a state of “rightlessness”: these 
unfortunate people, for various reasons (for which they are not innocent), have ended up in circumstances in which 
they do not seem to be recognized by any normative system, or to have even the right to have (e.g., legal) rights.  
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and possible) violations, eliminations, or reductions of normativity in order to understand and 
appreciate what normativity (positively) is. These may include, for instance, reductionisms of 
various stripes (e.g., attempts to reduce humanly distinctive normativity to, say, brain activity 
or evolutionary processes, or both)5 or populist politicians’ (e.g., Donald Trump’s) tendency to 
step out of normative contracts in international relations, preferring something like a 
Thrasymachian politics of force. Such tendencies do not acknowledge what is distinctive in the 
human form of life, because to be human is to live in a normative “space of reasons” that cannot 
be simply replaced by non-normative structures. For the same reason, human dignity – a notion 
I will return to in due course – cannot be grounded in recognition, or any other contingent 
attitudes, just as morality cannot be reduced to brain activity, for instance. 
A philosophical analysis on normativity is more widely relevant than it might 
initially appear. Its significance ranges from daily phenomena of interpersonal encounters to 
extremely complex political processes, and beyond. A “negative” investigation of normativity 
involves, moreover, a self-criticism of our normative form of life parallel to Kant’s analysis of 
the illegitimate transgressions of human reason manifested in the transcendental illusions he 
analyzes in the Transcendental Dialectic of the First Critique. For example, what I am calling 
“naturalizing reductions” of normativity can be seen as analogous to such illusions. There may 
even seem to be a kind of unavoidability inherent in them comparable to the unavoidability of 
transcendental illusion: it might seem that norms just have to be grounded in natural facts, even 
though in a sense they cannot be, more or less like it might in the Kantian context seem to our 
reason both that, for instance, the world as a totality must have spatio-temporal limits and that 
the world cannot have such limits.6 Naturalizing reductions tend to replace the philosophical 
(transcendental) question about the very possibility of normativity by an empirical and/or causal 
explanatory question about the emergence and development of normativity, and while there is 
of course nothing wrong with the latter kind of question as such, this replacement tendency 
leads us seriously astray – or so I will argue. 
 
“Human nature”: normativity as a philosophical-anthropological and cultural issue 
                                                        
5 Analogous criticism should be directed at attempts to reduce political normativity to something non-political; the 
autonomy of the political – and more generally normative – sphere is to be acknowledged. For example, when 
radically right-wing “ethno-nationalist” populists emphasize the genetic similarity among those belonging to an 
ethnos (e.g., the Finns), they are reducing the normative (nationality) to the natural (genes). 
6 No reading of Kant’s account of the antinomies, or other transcendental illusions, is of course attempted here. 
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The issue we are exploring goes back to the problem of “human nature”, or philosophical 
anthropology.7 In terms of Heikki Kannisto’s (1984) useful fourfold classification of the “ideal 
types” of philosophical conceptions of humanity, we may (in a simplified way) pose our basic 
question in this form: do we as human beings belong to an objective, independent, cosmic 
normative order (essentialism), are we without any such order (naturalism, existentialism), or 
are we creators of our own cultural normative order (culturalism)? How, moreover, can we 
decide between these alternatives? 
Following Kannisto’s terminology, we may say that reductive naturalism 
“factualizes” any normative order we might take ourselves to be inhabiting by reducing the 
classical essentialists’ (e.g., Aristotle’s) postulation of cosmic teleological normativity into 
mere nature, i.e., contingent and fully natural matters of fact, and thereby moves human beings 
out of any distinctive normative space of reasons to the realm of natural law. Such naturalism 
may be argued to be problematic precisely because of its inability to account for genuine 
normativity, but on the other hand it has at least since the Enlightenment plausibly questioned 
the classical essentialist postulation of Platonic or Aristotelian cosmic normativity beyond our 
concrete and contingent human activities (as well as Christian or other theological variants 
thereof).8 In contrast to both naturalism and essentialism, culturalism may be argued to be a 
plausible way of accounting for normativity: our normative sphere is humanly constructed; it 
is, for us, fully real without emanating from any Platonic or other transcendent sources beyond 
our human forms of life.9 
However, there is a problem analogous to naturalism within culturalism itself, 
because, ironically, cultural relativism, an arguably natural articulation or development of 
culturalism, may be just another way of “refactualizing” the normative order into mere 
contingent matters of fact.10 While culturalism emphasizes that human beings live in a 
normatively structured human world that is largely of their own making, rather than being 
placed within a pre-established teleology and cosmic normativity in a classical (e.g., 
                                                        
7 Cf. Kannisto 1984; Pihlström 2003, 2016; and especially, for an indication of the current recovery of 
philosophical anthropology, particularly in relation to debates over naturalism, Honenberger 2016. 
8 Another line of argument critical of classical essentialism is of course existentialism, according to which human 
beings have no ahistorical metaphysical essence but individually create their own lives and normative principles 
in the contingent (absurd) situations they happen to find themselves in. Due to its radical individualism, 
existentialism might also lead to a fragmentation of normativity, though for reasons different from naturalism. 
9 This can be regarded as, essentially, a Kantian-cum-Wittgensteinian framework for philosophical anthropology, 
with the world-constituting activity of the Kantian transcendental subject reconceptualized as a Wittgensteinian 
normatively structured form of life. 




Aristotelian) sense, this idea rapidly collapses into relativism as soon as we admit that any such 
structuring of normative frameworks takes place within specific and spatio-temporally 
localized historical cultural spheres.11 The challenge for culturalist philosophical anthropology 
is to maintain as much irreducible normativity as possible without postulating any Platonic or 
Aristotelian essentialist normativity that cannot be grounded in natural processes. This is, I 
suppose, the traditional issue of nature vs. culture all over again, with broadly culturalist 
approaches ranging from Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason (with their 
specific normative tasks) to John Dewey’s (1929) analysis of “experience and nature” and 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) claim to study “the natural history of human forms of life”. 
It is, in my view, exactly this challenge that pragmatism – speaking of pragmatism 
generally as a philosophical orientation from Peirce and James to Rorty and Putnam, and 
beyond – has seriously aspired to meet.12 I have always found pragmatism one of the most 
promising philosophical approaches in this discussion, as it takes seriously both non-reductive 
naturalism and irreducible cultural normativity.13 Instead of pragmatism, I will here shortly turn 
to the concept of recognition, however (postponing a brief discussion of pragmatism to a later 
section). Could recognition theory, we may now ask, also be employed to make sense of the 
emergence of the normative order as such? Or does it already presuppose a normative order? Is 
there a “first” recognition act upon which the normativity of our social world could be in 
principle based? These are among the questions that need to be addressed by anyone taking 
seriously the task of bridging the gap between naturalism and culturalism, and it might be 
tempting to think that recognition theory could resolve this issue. 
Without claiming that contemporary recognition theorists are actually in the 
business of doing so, it might be tempting to see recognition as a way of account for the 
possibility of normativity. Thus, normativity would be grounded in acts of recognition. (In a 
sense this goes back to Hegel’s dialectic of the master and the slave.) But if this is the case, is 
there an “original” – and hence natural – situation with no recognition acts in place yet? There 
                                                        
11 Hilary Putnam (1983) also aptly suggests that cultural relativism ought to be understood as a species of 
(reductive) naturalism. Both are, in short, haunted by the loss of normativity. 
12 I try to offer a pragmatist yet transcendental philosophical anthropology (with special emphasis on the problem 
of death and mortality) in Pihlström 2016. 
13 More generally, the three critical (transcendental) philosophies of normativity that I am trying to understand 
and develop further in my own work (e.g., Pihlström 2016) are Kantianism, pragmatism, and Wittgensteinianism. 
Obviously they cannot be explored here at any length, but this essay as a whole is crucially informed by a 
pragmatist approach to normativity (as will become more explicit in due course). For a more comprehensive 




would, ideally, have to be, if recognition were to offer a ground for normativity in the sense of 
turning initially natural facts into normative statuses. If so, then how does, or how did, 
normativity emerge from such a purely factual situation? From recognitions of normative 
statuses perhaps? But then how do we know (or how did the “first recognizers” know) to whom, 
or to what, such recognition acts should, or even could, be directed? Let me re-emphasize that 
I find these much more important – and more human – questions than the allegedly deep 
question of how, say, consciousness emerged, or emerges, from non-conscious matter. The 
questions concerning recognition and normativity are presumably also less prone to lead to 
postulations of mysterious qualia or other strange non-natural entities that may not seem to fit 
into the scientific worldview.14 The Kantian issue of legitimacy, or entitlement, cannot be 
settled by focusing on any quasi-scientific factual question. 
Let me illustrate our problem with reference to the very distinctive horrors 
brought into our social and cultural world by Nazism. What is relevant here is, arguably, the 
Nazis’ destruction of (almost) all normative (ethical, political, legal, etc.) statuses of the victims, 
or most of them at least (cf. Snyder 2010, 2015). Ironically, the Nazis did have their own “laws” 
and a “Volksgericht” delivering “legal” judgments within their bizarre society, but these 
perversions of normativity were ultimately based on a thoroughly biologistic doctrine of 
Lebensraum and racism; accordingly, the normativity at work in the Nazi system was, arguably, 
almost entirely reducible, and indeed rather literally reduced, to both the victims’ and the 
perpetrators’ racial and biological contingencies, such as the Germans’ allegedly natural need 
for Lebensraum and the fact that the non-Aryan “lower races” of the East were on the way. As 
Holocaust writers like Primo Levi forcefully testify, the Nazis largely succeeded in reducing 
their victims into mere beasts, not merely by what they concretely did to them but also by using 
the kind of non-humanizing language they used (Levi 1988), while in a sense remaining human 
themselves, because remaining guilty and responsible for what they did. This reduction of 
human beings to mere animals is carefully analyzed in Holocaust literature, including Levi’s 
compelling work.15 But it required a philosophical-political analysis of the magnitude of 
                                                        
14 Putnam (1999) persuasively argues that there is something seriously wrong in the temptation to think of the 
mind in terms of a (quasi-)scientific mystery in the first place. I agree, though I am not investigating the mind here, 
except in the extremely broad sense that normativity (naturally) requires mental or psychological creatures. 
15 On Levi’s importance in the acknowledgment of the meaninglessness of suffering, see Pihlström 2020, chapter 
6. In a Wittgensteinian analysis of Levi, Sparti (2005) argues that acknowledging others as humans, or the lack 
thereof, needs a form of life as its context – and my argument in this paper will come close to this line of thought. 
However, Sparti speaks about our responsibility of acknowledging others; again, the question is how (and when) 
such a normative responsibility arises. Doesn’t it already need a normative context to be so much as possible? For 
a compelling analysis of the way in which the horror of the Holocaust moves us beyond language and the 
normative, see Cavarero 2018. 
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Hannah Arendt’s to show what novel kind of crime the Nazi crime was. In Arendtian terms, the 
elimination of human spontaneity in totalitarianism (Arendt 1958) can be seen as a version of 
the reduction of normativity into mere natural factuality, or even non-human bestiality. 
Our problem is that normativity is irreducible but not non- or supernatural. It is 
crucial to avoid both “bald naturalism” and “rampant Platonism”, as John McDowell (1996) 
aptly calls them. This needs to be done across the board from logic and epistemology to ethics 
and political philosophy.16  
 
Recognition 
Let us move on to a slightly more detailed discussion of recognition as a ground of normativity. 
I am not seeking to offer any comprehensive account of contemporary recognition theory; my 
remarks may be understood as critical suggestions that would, I think, have to be addressed by 
anyone who proposes recognition as a “natural” (socio-)psychological ground of normativity, 
but this is compatible with acknowledging that contemporary recognition theorists themselves 
would only rarely do so. 
My worry with the notion of recognition in this context, as already hinted at 
above, is that it may be too psychologizing and, hence, also naturalistically “factualizing” a 
concept to be able to account for the possibility of normativity in a sufficiently deep 
transcendental sense.17 In its own way, recognition theory may seem to reduce normative 
                                                        
16 McDowell’s (1996) notion of “second nature” might also be helpful here (cf. Pihlström 2003, 2005), but if so, 
it also needs, for our purposes, to be transcendentally (as well as pragmatically) articulated, with normativity 
naturally based on (but not reduced to) our on-going critical self-reflection, focusing on our constant failure to 
follow the norms and rules that govern our lives. (A “via negativa” method is at work here, again.) This approach 
might come close to Korsgaard’s (1996) Kantian account of procedural normativity. Having dealt with 
McDowell’s (and, more briefly, Korsgaard’s) views on earlier occasions (Pihlström 2005, chapters 2-3), I won’t 
dwell on this issue here, while I warmly agree with his understanding of the ethical as “a domain of rational 
requirements” to which we are “alerted” by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities through enculturating 
upbringing (see McDowell 1996, 82), and with his antireductionist view that nothing non-normative can ground 
or justify the normative. 
17 There can be no brief answer to the question (raised by one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper) why I am 
including pragmatism in my “relaxed” articulation of transcendental philosophy while excluding recognition 
theory, which might seem to have a much more intimate connection with German idealism and hence with the 
transcendental tradition than pragmatism does. The only obvious reason is that I see recognition theory as, qua 
Hegelian, giving up at least one basic idea of transcendental inquiry, i.e., transcendental idealism, while I see 
pragmatism as a Kantian approach precisely in its attempts to rearticulate transcendental idealism in a “naturalized” 
and historicized shape. (The same goes for the later Wittgenstein as a transcendental thinker; cf. Pihlström 2003.) 
Moreover, my criticism of recognition theory is restricted to the understanding of recognition as basically 
psychological and socio-psychological action; insofar as this perhaps overly psychologistic characterization of 
recognition theory is inaccurate, I am pleased to welcome recognition theory as a contribution to a (quasi-
)transcendental analysis of the possibility of normativity, too. 
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structures to our acts of recognition, that is, something that we as contingent psychological and 
social individuals “naturally” do (or fail to do). As a further approximation of our problem, 
consider now this question: could there be a duty to recognize (say, someone as something) if 
one just doesn’t “feel” the compelling demand coming from the other’s point of view, such as 
their request for recognition, as already binding in any sense? The vocabulary of duties, it seems 
to me, would come too early here. The mere availability of such a question shows that 
recognition cannot be the ultimate ground of moral duty, or any duty. Or consider, again, this: 
if there was a first act of recognition, was it an idealization like the Hobbesian sovereign arising 
from a state of nature, or Rawlsian justice emerging from an original position behind the veil 
of ignorance? Such an idealized postulation would in my view put the cart before the horse 
precisely because recognition is too contingent to account for normativity at a transcendental 
level, or for the grounding of the normative order in our natural psycho-social characteristics 
and (merely factually conceived) human nature. (The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for any 
other psychological or natural, generally non-normative, attempts to account for the grounding 
of normativity.) 
A practice of recognition is, indeed, a practice. We need a well functioning set of 
already normatively structured and established human practices in order for there to be acts of 
recognition at all. Systematic recognition theory (cf., e.g., Koskinen 2017, 2019) analyzes those 
practices and the concepts they invoke in great philosophical detail and with admirable 
sophistication, but as far as I can see it cannot ground the normative order as such (nor is it, I 
suppose, necessarily taken to, though, unless recognition is proposed as the fundamental 
concept in social ontology).18 Yet somehow norms undeniably do arise out of our natural ways 
of doing things. I would be inclined to analyze this phenomenon in terms of our “naturally” 
occupying or engaging in always already (for us) irreducibly normative forms of life 
(Wittgenstein), or practices (pragmatism). But the question remains: how do these forms of life 
or practices get their distinctive normativity? From recognition acts perhaps – but by whom, 
and based on what? 
In a sense, recognition shares the problem of naturalism and cultural relativism: 
the worry is that it ultimately amounts to a “refactualization” of the normative order. It functions 
very well as “social glue” and is arguably ontologically constitutive of the social world as we 
                                                        
18 Again, let me emphasize that my criticism is not primarily directed at contemporary recognition theory – which 
might indeed have received sufficiently transcendental elaborations by its practitioners – but at a temptation to 
employ this theory in an attempt to ground normativity in contingent acts of recognition. 
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know it, but it cannot transcendentally function as the necessary condition for the possibility of 
normativity. This is because there must already be a rich context of normative statuses at work 
in order for any act of recognition (i.e., recognizing, or failing to recognize, such statuses) to be 
so much as possible. This can be explicated by means of transcendental argumentation. In order 
for us to be able to recognize, or fail to recognize, anything whatsoever, in any sense stronger 
than a mere natural reaction (in principle available to “mere animals”), as having a normative 
status of any kind, we must already live in a normative order, a space of reasons. This is 
comparable to the way in which we, according to Kant, need a system of categories already in 
place for us to be able to have cognitive experience of any object or event – rather than a mere 
Humean “rhapsody” of sense impressions. Recognition can no more ground the possibility of 
normativity than the Kantian categories (as normative requirements for objecthood) can be 
grounded by or derived from (Humean) experience, or Wittgensteinian rules of using language 
within a language-game from mere marks and noises. Any theory finding recognition 
foundational for morality and normativity is therefore (in an extremely broad sense) “Humean” 
rather than Kantian.19 
Let us elaborate on the problems and prospects of the notion of recognition in this 
context by taking a slightly more detailed look at a recent investigation of the topic developing 
and applying the original insights of Axel Honneth (2005) and other pioneers of the theory. In 
their introduction to the valuable new volume, Recognition and Religion (2019),20 Maijastina 
Kahlos, Heikki J. Koskinen, and Ritva Palmén emphasize the relevance of recognition theory 
to the issue of normativity by reminding us that in contemporary recognition theory, recognition 
in its most relevant sense means that “to recognize someone is to grant another human being a 
positive normative status based on her personhood” (1). “On the most general level”, therefore, 
a recognition act “means taking and treating the other as a person” (ibid., 1). When this is 
specified, “particular aspects of personhood” are brought into the picture, and then we can, 
following Honneth’s seminal theory, distinguish between respect, esteem, and love (focusing 
on general human dignity, specific identities, and unique individual personhood, respectively) 
as the main dimensions of recognition (ibid., 1-2). 
The editors continue to label recognition “a fundamental normative phenomenon” 
and to suggest that it “constitutes an adequate response to specific aspects of personhood” and 
                                                        
19 In addition to being Hegelian, of course. There is a sense in which my discussion here parallels Kantian criticisms 
of Humean accounts of ethics based on sympathy. Cf. again Kivistö & Pihlström 2020. 
20 This book is a rich collection of essays ranging from various historical explorations to theological and 
philosophical analyses of recognition phenomena in different historical and systematic contexts. 
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may even play a crucial role “in the very constitution of general personhood, as well as more 
specific aspects of it” (ibid., 2). While the paradigmatic case of recognition is “a mutual granting 
of positive statuses between individual human persons”, recognition extends to social groups 
as well as “normative entities quite generally” (ibid., 2). Fortunately, we are also reminded that 
although recognition is generally positive and a “vital human need”, it has a “darker side” due 
to misrecognitions, power relations, and the need to “struggle” for recognition (cf. again 
Honneth 2005). Kahlos, Koskinen, and Palmén also take what we may call a “realistic” attitude 
to recognition by claiming that though it was Hegel whose work signals a turning point in the 
development of recognition theory, “the phenomena themselves were already present before 
their conceptual articulation by Hegel”, because recognition is, indeed, a “basic human need” 
and presumably even constitutive of human persons and their identities (Kahlos et al. 2019, 
4).21 
Given the task of this paper, we again need to ask how “fundamental”, exactly, 
recognition is as a normative phenomenon. One obvious question related to this general issue 
is how far the recognition theorist needs to go in the direction of realism. Would it be possible 
to maintain that recognition “phenomena” are, though “real”, themselves something constituted 
(e.g., by further recognition acts)? They are themselves social phenomena, after all. This is a 
more general question regarding realism about the normative (as well as about historical social 
facts and institutions). In this context, however, a possibly more serious philosophical question 
can be formulated on the basis of the overview of normativity sketched above. No matter how 
“fundamental” recognition is as a “normative phenomenon”, it can be claimed that it is only 
possible within a context that is itself already richly normative. Perhaps the recognition theorist 
seeks to emphasize such irreducible normativity by suggesting that social reality is constituted 
by recognition acts, but my transcendental worry is that the very identity of those acts as 
recognition acts (rather than acts of some other kind) already presupposes a normative context. 
Another issue the above-quoted comments raise is related to the strong emphasis on personhood 
among many recognition theorists. Does the world, we may ask, somehow divide itself up to, 
e.g., persons and non-persons already prior to recognition acts? Or do those acts (as is 
occasionally suggested) constitute persons (etc.) in a strong ontological sense?22 But then how 
                                                        
21 Saarinen’s (2016) historically detailed study also emphasizes that in theological and religious contexts 
recognition has been conceptualized in the history a long time before Hegel. 
22 Would our recognizing another as a person constitute their personhood also if we (or just I?) recognized animals, 
machines (artificial intelligence, robots), Martians, or the replicas familiar from the film Blade Runner as persons? 
Where would, or could, we draw the line? 
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is it determined what kinds of things can through recognition acts be turned into persons? Some 
kind of “pre-recognition” must arguably have taken place for relevant kinds of beings to be 
even potentially recognizable as persons rather than something else. This, in turn, presupposes 
criteria of relevance that must, again, already be regarded as normative. Therefore, there just is 
no way to ground normativity in mere psychological acts of recognition, or contingent 
psychological acts of any kind. 
Recognizing other human beings as persons, Koskinen (2019, 36) notes, involves 
acknowledging “their normative status as persons”. Koskinen also refers to Robert Brandom’s 
notion of “robust recognition”, “the practical attitude of recognizing another as a simple 
recognizer”, “as itself the kind of thing for which things can have a specifically normative 
significance” (ibid., 40). However, as recognition theorists like Koskinen of course clearly 
acknowledge, the normative form of life we share with other human beings may require (or 
even normatively obligate) us to recognize human beings for whom things do not, and cannot, 
have any normative significance because they lack the capacity to attribute such, or any, 
significance to anything. When Brandom and Koskinen characterize interpersonal recognition 
as an act of “[t]aking something to be subject to appraisals of its reasons, holding it rationally 
responsible” and thus of “treating it as someone: as one of us (rational beings)” (ibid., 42, 
quoting Brandom), the immediate issue that arises is how we should account for our recognizing 
human beings who are not persons, and not, except perhaps potentially but (tragically) not 
actually, among “us”, such as the permanently ill or severely mentally disabled? 
It is, I would like to argue, only within an always already normative context 
guided by something like (among others) the idea of human dignity – or some suitably general 
and irreducibly normative equivalent – that we can so much as ask whether, and how exactly, 
our various acts of recognition, or our failures to commit such acts, are appropriate or 
inappropriate, acknowledging or constituting relevant normative statuses. Dignity is 
transcendentally presupposed by any consideration of recognition vs. non- or misrecognition. 
It is, in short, only within a human form of life that is already thoroughly ethical and normative 
that we can discuss whether, and how, to recognize someone or something as something (and 
why). If this is the case, the human form of life in its normative dimensions just cannot arise 
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from (mere) recognition. We must be human in order for us to be able to engage in recognition 
acts.23  
In my view, these remain open issues; this paper admittedly raises more questions 
than it provides answers to. It is, in any event, unclear to what extent recognition is (or is even 
claimed by recognition theorists like Koskinen to be) a “fundamental” normative phenomenon 
in the sense that it could be taken to ground the normative order we live in, or the human form 
of life as such. I have suggested that contingent recognition acts are less fundamental than our 
already finding ourselves committed to and guided by normativity, because we need to so 
conceptualize our lives in order to be able to engage in any such acts in the first place. Therefore, 
normative statuses cannot be ultimately constituted by such recognition acts. But I also 
acknowledge the possibility that recognition theory might actually seek to express the kind of 
notion of dignity that I am invoking, because the affirmation of dignity as normatively 
foundational may itself be regarded as a recognition act.24 If so, then recognition theory would 
already presuppose normativity more or less along the lines suggested in this paper – in which 
case the transcendental criticism of recognition would lose much of its relevance. 
Be that as it may, recognition is arguably slightly less fundamental than we might 
be tempted to think, but we should be open to elaborations of recognition theory that render it 
closer to the transcendental requirements for “grounding” I have emphasized here. Furthermore, 
one might, in Wittgensteinian terms, also argue that recognition acts are always (for better or 
worse) somehow “reasoned” or “ratiocinated”, while our being committed to normativity in 
general is, rather, based on “blind” rule-following, on our being “naturally” (though obviously 
not in the sense of reductive naturalism) engaged in the kind of practices within which our 
language-games find their homes.25 A pragmatist (Peircean) version of this criticism would 
emphasize that particular recognition acts presuppose a wider context of habituality that is, 
again, already normatively structured. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will try to further illuminate these issues by briefly returning 
to philosophical anthropology and then by taking a look at how “holistic pragmatism”, a 
specific development of pragmatism, views the relation between the normative and the natural.  
                                                        
23 “Let us be human”, Wittgenstein once wrote (1980, 36), perhaps indicating that being human is already a task, 
something that normatively challenges us (as humans) only from within a human form of life – otherwise the 
encouragement would hardly make sense. (This phrase, like many Wittgensteinian ones, is thus arguably much 
more complex than its apparent simplicity might lead us to think.) 
24 Thanks are due to one of the referees for this very important point. 




Dignity and the threat of refactualization 
In contrast to any position that defends, say, human equality (understood as ethical and/or 
political or more generally normative) or basic human rights on the basis of merely natural and 
contingent facts about human beings, I would be willing to suggest, drawing inspiration from 
Veikko Launis’s (2018) recent work on human dignity, that the category of the human being, 
and the related category of human dignity, should be treated as more foundational than the 
category of the person, or the concept of “human rights”.26 I have argued above that our moral 
and generally normative reality cannot be transcendentally (regarding the conditions of its 
possibility) grounded in our acts of recognition even if such acts are constitutive of the 
normative and the social (and of personhood) in an ontological sense. In order for such acts 
themselves to be possible, we must, I have suggested, live in a thoroughly normative sphere in 
which we, for instance, evaluate any morally relevant acts and uses of language, including our 
recognizing behavior, in terms of our being already responsive to human dignity. This 
normative sphere is not reducible to contingent recognitions of personhood based on natural 
capacities, and it also invokes a notion of humanity wider than the category of the person, 
because we need to treat with dignity also those human beings who clearly lack the rational and 
other capacities of persons (e.g., deeply mentally disabled people). Our responsibility of 
treating others with dignity does not arise from our psychology or brain structure. It is, as 
Wittgensteinians might put it, there – “like our life”.27 
A worry that now rearises is whether our transcendental notion of human dignity, 
or any other normative notion we might use in a comparably fundamental (transcendental) 
normative role, is just a cultural specificity based on particular recognition acts we commit in 
our local cultural surroundings. Is it merely a local cultural practice, ultimately reducible to 
mere facts about what we in this specific culture do, to treat other human beings as equal?28 
This question brings us back to the issue concerning the relation between normativity and 
“human nature”. Is there a kind of normativity already in place that enables us to, for example, 
ask the question whether it is our moral duty to avoid sexism or racism, or does our contingent 
                                                        
26 Launis’s (2018) comprehensive work on human dignity is available only in Finnish. On the irreducible 
significance of the notion of the (other) human being in our lives, see, e.g., Gaita 2000. 
27 Cf. Wittgenstein 1969. In this sense, Sparti’s (2005) way of speaking about the “responsibility” for 
acknowledging as more fundamental than acknowledging itself sounds somewhat problematic (and, despite his 
Wittgensteinian approach, curiously non-Wittgensteinian). 
28 This could be taken to be a problem analogous to the issue of epistemic and/or scientific norms of rationality 
being based on the contingent reasonings by scientists and other inquirers in specific historical contexts. 
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recognizing the normative statuses of (say) women and people representing “other” ethnic 
backgrounds create any normativity there is in matters like this? We are back in basic issues of 
philosophical anthropology all over again. 
Returning to Kannisto’s (1984) scheme briefly introduced above, we may recall 
that cultural relativism is a natural development of culturalism, with the alarming tendency to 
“refactualize” the culture-specific normative order. Even if “we” in our culture do recognize 
women and non-white people, for instance, as fundamentally equal to white men, and if we set 
this recognition as a universal model to be carried over into other cultures as well, are we still 
only dealing with a local specificity that can ultimately be reduced to a mere contingent fact 
about how we behave and how we happen to think others ought to behave, too? How exactly 
should the relation between the natural and the cultural (or the contingently factual and the 
normative) be understood? 
Pragmatism, as pointed out above, is an attempt to bridge the gap between the 
natural and the cultural, and therefore we should, before concluding the discussion, take a quick 
look at a promising pragmatist way of dealing with normativity.29 
 
Holistic pragmatism and normativity 
One suggestion for a way of developing a pragmatist philosophical anthropology entangling 
naturalism and normativity is Morton White’s (1956, 2002) holistic pragmatism, which is 
basically an epistemological position but can be extended to a more general account of the 
“human form of life” (cf. Pihlström 2011, 2015). In a Quinean manner, White labels his 
pragmatism “holistic”; indeed, like his long-time friend and colleague W.V. Quine, he follows 
the anti-Cartesian and more generally anti-rationalist line of pragmatist thought (White 2002, 
3-5), abandoning any “first philosophy”. The distinctive character of White’s position naturally 
emerges against the background of Quine’s more extreme (and better known) views. While 
both Quine and White begin from a firm rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction and from 
the holistic idea that our beliefs (or sentences we assent to) are not tested individually but “face 
                                                        
29 Another relevant pragmatist approach not to be explored here would be Rorty’s ethnocentrism, according to 
which we just have to “start from where we are”, i.e., where we contingently find ourselves, and develop our 
“vocabularies” with the “ironic” awareness of the contingency of that starting point. We should not, I think, assess 
Rorty’s pragmatism purely negatively; his emphasis on the historical contingency of our most fundamental 
normative frameworks is, I think, to be taken very seriously. I am, however, looking for a pragmatist account that 
would be reconcilable with a transcendental inquiry into normativity, and here Rorty seems to of little help – a 
form of pragmatism more responsive to the transcendental “vocabulary” is needed. 
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the tribunal of experience” in corporate bodies, they draw quite different morals from this 
picture.  
Whereas philosophy of science was, for Quine, “philosophy enough”, White 
recommends that we extend holism from the philosophy of science to philosophy of culture, 
thematizing not only science but also other normative practices, such as religion, history, art, 
law, and morality (ibid., x-xi). This “cultural philosophy” covers philosophy of science as one 
of its subfields, but White insists that other cultural institutions require empirically informed 
philosophical scrutiny no less than science does (ibid., xiii). Holistic pragmatism maintains that 
“philosophy of art, of religion, of morality, or of other elements of culture is in great measure 
a discipline that is epistemically coordinate with philosophy of natural science” (ibid., 66). The 
idea that ethics, in particular, may be viewed as “empirical” if one includes feelings of moral 
obligation as well as empirical experiences in the “flux” of experience employed in the on-
going critical testing of one’s beliefs has been strongly present in White’s writings from an 
early stage to the present (see White 1956, 1981, 2002). White is thus one of those philosophers 
who can be read as having defended a pragmatic form of moral and generally normative realism 
(cf. Pihlström 2005). 
Quine (1953) took his famous holistic step by arguing that even logical truths are 
not immune to revision, because they are tested along with factual claims as components of 
larger conjunctions of statements (White 2002, 71). No general analytic/synthetic division can 
be drawn, as statements about, say, the synonymity of terms are ultimately empirical, describing 
the contingencies of factual language-use (ibid., 71, 73). Despite this fundamental agreement 
with Quine, White argues against Quine that “observation sentences” (e.g., “That’s a rabbit”) 
and ethical sentences such as “That’s outrageous” cannot be sharply separated from each other 
any more than analytic and synthetic statements can; their difference is a matter of degree, not 
a difference in kind (ibid., 154-155, 160-163). Yet, ethical sentences at issue are genuinely 
normative: 
Avoiding the view that ethical sentences are synonymous with sociological or 
psychological sentences, and being impressed by the failure of reductive 
phenomenalism as well as the power of holism to bridge the traditional epistemic 
gap created by the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, I propose a 
nonreductive version of holism in order to bridge the gap between the moral and 
the descriptive […]. (Ibid., 157.) 
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That is, descriptive statements and normative ethical principles form conjunctions that are 
tested holistically, just as Quine had argued that empirical and logico-mathematical beliefs in 
science are. Logic, science, and ethics form a unified whole, a holistic web without epistemic 
dichotomies. Moreover, as logical principles may, by Quinean lights, be given up in the face of 
sufficiently recalcitrant experience, descriptive statements may be denied in order to preserve a 
normative principle we do not want to give up (ibid., 159), although such situations may be 
rare. Hence, ethics is not immune to empirical evaluation, as feelings of obligation together 
with sensory observation link ethical sentences to the natural world. Pace Quine, ethics is, then, 
“anchored in experience” (ibid., 160). Furthermore, “feeling sentences” are fallible and can also 
be surrendered when a conjunction is tested (ibid., 166). Both ethics and science are, hence, 
corrigible yet cognitive elements of normatively structured human culture that in the end 
constitutes a holistic totality instead of any compartmentalized group of distinct areas with 
definite boundaries. Knowledge and morals, as White himself put it many years ago, form a 
“seamless web” (White 1956, 287). 
As an example of holistic pragmatism at work, consider the following argument: 
(1) One can be morally responsible for one’s actions (or have moral duties) only if one acts 
freely (i.e., is a genuine agent). 
(2) One can act freely only if one possesses free will. 
(3) Only individuals (can) have wills. 
(4) Therefore, groups and collectives (e.g., business corporations) cannot have a will. 
(5) Therefore, groups (etc.) cannot act freely and are not genuine agents. 
(6) Therefore, groups (etc.) cannot be morally responsible. 
(7) Therefore, there is no such thing as moral/social responsibility, nor any moral duties, 
attributed to business corporations. 
 
Now, according to holistic pragmatism, if we find the normative conclusion 
ethically unacceptable, we may legitimately revise or reject one of the factual premises. Thus, 
if we find it ethically impossible to maintain, e.g., that business corporations cannot be 
responsible for their actions (or that we should not attribute such responsibility to them), we 
may revise our picture of what (their) agency (including freedom, the will, etc.), or agency 
generally, is. The revised picture of agency must then also be made compatible with the rest of 
our beliefs. Moreover, we must provide further reasons for the thoroughly normative ethical 
“impossibility” motivating this belief revision. There is, then, at least potentially, an endless 
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process of mutual holistic normative adjustment of beliefs and evidence here – like in any 
empirical inquiry, yet extending to the fully normative sphere.In comparison, consider this 
argument: (1) Racism is true. (2) If racism is true, then racial discrimination is justified. (3) 
Therefore, racial discrimination is justified. Now, to reject (3), we need not merely find purely 
theoretical or evidential reasons to reject (1). We may reject (1) because (3) cannot work as an 
element of our overall holistic system of belief within the human form of life we find ourselves 
to be inhabiting. Our reason for rejecting a factual belief like (1) may be thoroughly normative, 
and holistic pragmatism makes sense of this. 
I would be happy to construe these ideas somewhat more metaphysically as 
yielding the claim that there are, for us, no “value-neutral” facts at all (see Pihlström 2005, 
2010), though I doubt that White himself ever intended them in such a metaphysical sense.30 In 
any case, White’s holism could be extended from the epistemic justification of different kinds 
of statements (sentences) or beliefs to whatever is the equivalent of such normative justification 
in the critical evaluation of entire cultural practices and normatively governed institutions. 
While remaining distinct from each other, such practices (e.g., science, politics, religion, art, 
and others) are dynamically interrelated and must therefore be evaluated holistically. A 
continuous critical (re)consideration of the normative structures that constitute our (thoroughly 
and irreducibly normative) form of life is precisely what holistic pragmatism calls for, and 
indeed makes sense of. 
Another extension for holistic pragmatism is also needed because White’s version 
is, arguably, too thin. Mere feelings of obligation are, again, just natural and contingent. 
Normative commitment to feeling-transcendent rational duty (in a quasi-Kantian sense) needs 
to be built into the holistic assessment of our normative-cum-factual belief systems. Moral 
emotions and even “mere” feelings do have a role to play here, but they cannot alone act as the 
epistemic ground for our moral commitments. And the same goes for more general normativity. 
This, however, would be a topic for another essay. 
 
Conclusion: humanism 
Holistic pragmatism is of course only one suggestion designed to meet our needs of defending 
the normative human form of life against reductively naturalizing (or “factualizing”) 
                                                        
30 White, like Putnam (2002), is strongly opposed to any metaphysical (“inflated”) version of the fact-value 
entanglement. This might be seen as a remnant of logical positivism, too. 
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tendencies, just as recognition theory has above been examined only as an example of an 
approach we might be tempted to employ in an attempt to ground normativity in natural human 
capabilities and actions. In addition to “positive” suggestions seeking to articulate a pragmatist 
philosophical anthropology integrating (soft) naturalism and culturalism, it is at least equally 
important to engage in a “negative” critical examination of well-intended yet (in my view) 
insufficiently deeply normative proposals such as recognition theory. Let me now close with 
brief general remarks. 
A defense of a normative order is – as my frequent references to the human “form 
of life” might also suggest – also a defense of a kind of humanism, even rather traditional 
Enlightenment humanism, with a reincarnation of the transcendental subject at its center, a 
subject self-reflectively examining its capacities and limits. This defense operates at a 
transcendental level: anti-, trans-, and post-humanism are all human beings’ attempts to reflect 
on their relation to pre-established social and cultural hierarchies, non-human nature, animals, 
intelligent machines, etc. – to something non-human. A kind of transcendental humanism thus 
ultimately prevails, because any such criticisms of traditional humanism (just like any acts of 
recognition or arguments concerning whom to recognize, as what, and why) must inevitably 
take place within a space of reasons and thus within the human normative order. Only 
transcendental humanism makes empirical anti- or posthumanisms possible, analogously to the 
way in which for Kant it is only transcendental idealism that can make empirical realism 
possible.31 Moreover, it is precisely on the basis of transcendental humanism that we can see 
the issue of normativity as inescapably – holistically – intertwined with the philosophical-
anthropological question about what the human being is like. 
I have argued for these conclusions by employing a negative philosophical 
method. In a more comprehensive discussion, it would be important to analyze critically not 
only the horrible cases of the elimination or reduction of normativity to mere nature, such as 
the Nazis’ reduction of the Jews to stateless and normless animals, to a kind of dehumanized 
indifference (cf. Levi 1988, Cavarero 2018), but also more “positive” reductionisms, such as 
the tendency to see the basis of morality in natural phenomena such as emotions.32 The 
                                                        
31 For these same humanistic reasons, I do not think the transcendental defense of dignity considered above extends 
to, say, non-human animals. But as our form of life changes, we might have to redefine what counts as “us”, or 
even as humans. Even then, this would be a human change, and a human redefining process, in principle to be 
accounted for in terms of transcendental humanism. 
32 Analyses of the Nazi tendency to destroy the human (and thus normative) status of their victims, such as 
Cavarero’s (2018), would benefit from an explicitly transcendental approach. For example, the very 
unforgiveability of the Nazi crimes may be seen as a transcendental insight into what the Nazis did: “Wherever 
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affirmation of human equality and dignity is, I have suggested, more fundamental than any 
contingent natural reactions (such as recognition) or any empirical evidence for or against 
contingent states of affairs. The commitment to valuing dignity constitutes the normative sphere 
within which (only) we can engage in the practice of discussing anything ethically or 
normatively at all.33 Hence it cannot be defended (or criticized) by means of empirical evidence; 
it is more fundamental (like religious belief is for some Wittgensteinian philosophers of 
religion), albeit not in principle non-revisable or infallible. Thus, we could definitely end up in 
a dystopic world rejecting human dignity, though it would be difficult for us to (now) include 
ourselves in that potential “we” that would have lost the transcendental framework of dignity 
inescapably characterizing our form of life. Moreover, holistic pragmatism reminds us that the 
boundary between the natural and the normative is itself constantly holistically tested and may 
historically change. Nothing, not even our normatively structured form of life conceived as a 
holistic totality, is beyond pragmatic critical transformation. This critical fallibilist spirit is itself 
inherent to humanism and to the normative framework that humanism defines.  
Furthermore, it may also be acknowledged, at the meta-level, that transcendental 
inquiry into normativity is in an important sense optional; one can avoid it and engage in what 
I have called “naturalizing reduction” (or, less reductively, recognition theory) instead. In a 
sense the reductionist approach would, if my argument is on the right track, be somewhat like 
living in a transcendental illusion. Yet, such an illusion is visible only from within, i.e., only 
when we have made a transcendental turn and committed to an “internal” analysis of 
normativity as constitutive of our lives. So whether the transcendental perspective is optional 
or not is a question receiving different answers depending on whether we have adopted that 
perspective or not. This reintroduces the relativism and refactualization issues all over again: 
our adopting the transcendental perspective in our inquiries is itself historically contingent, a 
                                                        
the human is injured, human beings can neither forgive nor punish this radical offense to the human as such.” 
(Ibid., 139.) It is self-evident that the Nazis had their own normative system, but a transcendental analysis may 
point out how deeply they were engaged in the dehumanizing project of destroying their victims’ normative 
statuses – including the language in terms of which their human form of life had been meaningful to them. (For 
transcendental engagements with the problem of suffering, see Kivistö & Pihlström 2016.) 
33 This could be regarded as a reformulation of what I have elsewhere called “pragmatic moral realism” based on 
a transcendental argument (Pihlström 2005). Again, the recognition theorist could respond that making this claim 
is itself an act of recognition. There is no need to deny this, but one way of rephrasing my point is to suggest that 
the “always already” presupposed acknowledgment of normativity as a transcendentally pervasive feature of the 
human world may (when analyzed from an external perspective provided by, say, recognition theory) be realized 
as empirical (factual) acts of recognition, just as our transcendental self can be seen as identical to our empirical 




local fact of the matter concerning our de facto processes of inquiry. And so it goes: the 
transcendental inquirer cannot avoid working within a kind of endlessly reflexive spiral. 
A final note is needed. The transcendental problem concerning the very possibility 
of normativity is, we should admit, a philosophical mystery deep enough to make it 
understandable (albeit not for that reason justifiable) that some of us think it cannot be solved 
without reference to something transcendent.34 However, the transcendental humanist 
maintains that even by making such a move we cannot get rid of our inescapably human starting 
point. Even theism would not liberate us from the burden of humanism and the puzzlement 
about normativity. Normativity is an enigma for us. In philosophical-anthropological terms, a 
culturalist (humanist) view of the irreducible normativity of the human world is in a constant 
danger of collapsing into either cosmic transcendent teleology (classical or Christian) or 
refactualizing naturalism and/or cultural relativism, or perhaps the individual contingency of 
existentialism.35 Transcendental humanism is needed at the meta-level to guide our search for 
plausible accounts defined by these open issues, and especially to guard us against too easy 
solutions.36 
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